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Abstract
For the classical power indices there is a disproportion between power
and relative weights, in general. We introduce two new indices, based
on weighted representations, which are proportional to suitable relative
weights and which also share several important properties of the classical
power indices. Imposing further restrictions on the set of representations
may lead to a whole family of such indices.
Keywords: voting power, power indices, proportionality, weighted majority
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1 Introduction
The observation, that the distribution of power in weighted majority games differs
from the distribution of voting weights, has motivated the development of a theory
of power measurement. A famous example considers three voters, having 50, 49,
and 1 votes. The motion is passed if the total number of votes in favor exceeds
50. Since any two voters, but none alone, can pass the motion, any reasonable
power index assigns equal power to all three voters.
The power distribution in the above example markedly differs from the relative
weight distribution:
∥∥( 50
100
, 49
100
, 1
100
)
−
(
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)∥∥
1
= 97
150
≈ 0.65. One reason for
this disagreement is the fact that voting weights are not unique. For three voters
having 100 votes in total, there are 1176 integer valued weight distributions being
extendable by a suitable quota to the same game. An example is given by the
weights 34, 33, 33 and a quota of 60. There are 13872 possibilities to represent
the game if the (integer) quota is considered to be part of the specification.
Having plenty of representations to choose from, can we choose voting weights
that accurately reflect power measured by some index? The theoretical litera-
ture shows that, in general, we cannot, although there are particular cases when
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it may be possible. Recently [Houy & Zwicker, 2014] have characterized a class
of weighted majority games, which admit a representation using their respec-
tive Banzhaf distribution. For the nucleolus, we known that (q(x⋆, v), x⋆) is
a representation of a constant-sum weighted majority game, where x⋆(v) de-
notes the nucleolus of v, and q(x⋆, v) denotes the corresponding maximum excess
[Maschler et al., 2013, Theorem 20.52]. If the weights are close to the average
weight of the voters, then the nucleolus is close to the relative weight distribution;
the two may even coincide under certain conditions, see [Kurz et al., 2014]. The
existing power indices are not representation compatible. One exception is the re-
cently introduced minimum sum representation (MSR) index [Freixas & Kaniovski, 2014].
Also the Colomer index [Colomer & Martinez, 1995] uses weights of a majority
game in its specification, but the index depends on the given representation,
instead of the underlying simple game.
In this paper, we show how to construct representation compatible power
indices for weighted majority games.
2 Games and representations
A simple game v is a mapping v : 2N → {0, 1}, where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set
of voters, such that v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1, and v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N .
The subsets S ⊆ N are called coalitions of v. We call a coalition S winning if
v(S) = 1, and losing otherwise. If S is a winning coalition and none of its proper
subsets is winning, it is called a minimal winning coalition. Similarly, if T is a
losing coalition and none of its proper supersets is losing, it is called a maximal
losing coalition. A voter i ∈ N with v(S) = v(S ∪{i}) for all S ⊆ N\{i} is called
a dummy (or null player by some authors).
A weighted majority game is a simple game v, such that there exist real num-
bers w1, . . . , wn ≥ 0 and q > 0 with
∑
s∈S ws ≥ q for all winning coalitions S ⊆ N
and
∑
s∈T ws < q for all losing coalitions T ⊆ N . We write v = [q;w1, . . . , wn],
where we call (q, w1, . . . , wn) a representation of v. A weight vector (w1, . . . , wn)
is called feasible for v, if there exists a quota q such that (q;w1, . . . , wn) is a rep-
resentation of v. For our initial example [2; 1, 1, 1], the weight vector (49, 48, 3)
is feasible, while (50, 25, 25) is not feasible.
We collect some basic well known facts about representations of weighted
majority games:
Lemma 1 Each weighted majority game v admits a representation (q, w1, . . . , wn)
with w1, . . . , wn ≥ 0, q > 0, and
(1)
∑n
i=1wi = 1, q ∈ (0, 1];
(2)
∑n
i=1wi = 1, q ∈ (0, 1], and wi = 0 for all dummies;
(3) q ∈ N, wi ∈ N.
We call a representation satisfying the conditions of (1) a normalized repre-
sentation, and those satisfying the conditions of (3) an integer representation. A
2
representation with wi = 0 for all dummies i ∈ N is called dummy revealing.
1
Algorithmic checks and descriptions whether a given simple game is weighted
have been studied extensively in the literature, see e.g. [Taylor & Zwicker, 1999].
Lemma 2 The set of all normalized weight vectors w ∈ Rn≥0,
∑n
i=1wi = 1 be-
ing feasible for a given weighted majority game v is given by the intersection∑
i∈S wi >
∑
i∈T wi for all pairs (S, T ), where S is a minimal winning and T is
a maximal losing coalition of v.
Lemma 3 The set of all normalized representations (q, w) ∈ Rn+1≥0 , q ∈ (0, 1],∑n
i=1wi = 1 representing a given weighted majority game v is given by the inter-
section
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q,
∑
i∈T wi < q for all minimal winning coalitions S and all
maximal losing coalitions T .
3 Power indices
Let Sn denote the set of simple games on n voters, and Wn the set of weighted
majority games on n voters. A power index for C ∈ {Sn,Wn | n ∈ N} is a
mapping g : C → Rn, where n denotes the number of voters in each game of C.
Usually, we define a vector-valued power index by defining its elements gi, the
power of a voter i ∈ N . The Shapley-Shubik index is given by
SSIi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(|N | − 1− |S|)!
|N |!
· (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)).
Definition 4 Let g : C → R|N | = (gi)i∈N be a power index for C. We say that
(1) g is symmetric: if for all v ∈ C and any bijection τ : N → τ we have
gτ(i)(τv) = gi(v), where τv(S) = v(τ(S)) for all S ⊆ N ;
(2) g is positive: if for all v ∈ C we have gi(v) ≥ 0 and g(v) 6= 0;
(3) g is efficient: if for all v ∈ C we have
∑n
i=1 gi(v) = 1;
(4) g satisfies the dummy property: if for all v ∈ C and all dummies i of v we
have gi(v) = 0.
The Shapley-Shubik index is symmetric, positive, efficient, and satisfies the
dummy property.
In this paper, we consider power indices that can be defined on the set of
weighted games. Having proportionality of weights and power in mind we define:
Definition 5 A power index g : Wn → R
n for weighted majority games on n
voters is called representation compatible if (g1(v), . . . , gn(v)) is feasible for all
v ∈ Wn.
1The problem of checking whether a voter is a dummy in a general (integer) representation
it coNP-complete [Chalkiadakis et al., 2011, Theorem 4.4].
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We remark that the Shapley-Shubik index is representation compatible for
Wn if and only if n ≤ 3. Below, we list the weighted majority games with up to
3 voters (in minimum sum integer representation), and the representation given
by the Shapley-Shubik vector.
[1; 1] = [1; 1] [1; 1, 0, 0] =
[
6
6
; 6
6
, 0
6
, 0
6
]
[2; 1, 1, 1] =
[
4
6
;
2
6
,
2
6
,
2
6
]
[1; 1, 0] =
[
2
2
;
2
2
;
0
2
]
[1; 1, 1, 0] =
[
3
6
; 3
6
, 3
6
, 0
6
]
[3; 1, 1, 1] =
[
6
6
;
2
6
,
2
6
,
2
6
]
[1; 1, 1] =
[
1
2
;
1
2
,
1
2
]
[2, 1, 1, 0] =
[
6
6
; 3
6
, 3
6
, 0
6
]
[3; 2, 1, 1] =
[
5
6
;
4
6
,
1
6
,
1
6
]
[2, 1, 1] =
[
2
2
;
1
2
,
1
2
]
[1; 1, 1, 1] =
[
2
6
; 2
6
, 2
6
, 2
6
]
[2; 2, 1, 1] =
[
2
6
;
4
6
,
1
6
,
1
6
]
For n ≥ 4, consider the example v = [3; 2, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0] with n−4 dummies.
The Shapley-Shubik index of v is given by
(
1
2
, 1
6
, 1
6
, 1
6
, 0, . . . , 0
)
. Since {2, 3, 4} is
a winning coalition with weight 1
2
, and {1} is a losing coalition with an equal
weight, the Shapley-Shubik vector cannot be feasible.
4 Representation compatible power indices
The aim of this paper was to design power indices, which are representation
compatible. Given a set of representations of the same weighted majority game
v, each convex combination gives a representation of v too. So a simple idea
to construct a representation compatible power index is to specify the set of
representations and the weights of the convex combination.
4.1 The average weight index
Definition 6 The average weight index of a weighted majority game v is the
average of all normalized2 weight vectors which are feasible for v.
For [3; 2, 1, 1] we have already mentioned the sets of minimal winning and
maximal losing coalitions. Applying Lemma 2 gives the constraints
w1 + w2 > w1 ⇐⇒ w2 > 0
w1 + w3 > w1 ⇐⇒ w3 > 0
w1 + w2 > w2 + w3 ⇐⇒ w1 > w3
w1 + w3 > w2 + w3 ⇐⇒ w1 > w2,
2Taking all weight vectors instead of the normalized ones does not make a difference.
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in addition to w1, w2, w3 ≥ 0 and w1 + w2 + w3 = 1. Eliminating the variable w3
via w3 = 1− w1 − w2 and removing the redundant constraints leaves
w2 > 0 ⇐⇒ w2 > 0
1− w1 − w2 > 0 ⇐⇒ w2 < 1− w1
w1 > 1− w1 − w2 ⇐⇒ w2 > 1− 2w1
w1 > w2 ⇐⇒ w2 < w1
Since we need 1−2w1 < w1 and 1−w1 > 0, we have w1 ∈
(
1
3
, 1
)
. For w1 ∈
(
1
3
, 1
2
)
the conditions condense to w2 ∈
(
1− 2w1, w1
)
and for w1 ∈
[
1
2
, 1
)
the conditions
condense to w2 ∈
(
0, 1− w1
)
.
The (scaled) average weight for voter 1 is given by
∫ 1
2
1
3
∫ w1
1−2w1
w1 dw2 dw1 +
∫ 1
1
2
∫ 1−w1
0
w1 dw2 dw1 =
1
54
+
1
12
=
11
108
.
For voter 2 we similarly obtain∫ 1
2
1
3
∫ w1
1−2w1
w2 dw2 dw1 +
∫ 1
1
2
∫ 1−w1
0
w2 dw2 dw1 =
1
48
+
5
432
=
7
216
.
Since the volume of the feasible region is given by∫ 1
2
1
3
∫ w1
1−2w1
1 dw2 dw1 +
∫ 1
1
2
∫ 1−w1
0
1 dw2 dw1 =
1
8
+
1
24
=
1
6
,
we have∫ 1
2
1
3
∫ w1
1−2w1
w3 dw2 dw1 +
∫ 1
1
2
∫ 1−w1
0
w3 dw2 dw1 =
1
6
−
11
108
−
7
216
=
7
216
.
Normalizing, or dividing by the volume of the feasible region, yields the power
distribution
(
11
18
, 7
36
, 7
36
)
, with a norm-1-distance of 1
9
to the respective Shapley-
Shubik vector
(
2
3
, 1
6
, 1
6
)
.
Actually we have dealt with the polyhedron P =
{
(w1, w2) ∈ R
2 | w2 ≥
0, w2 ≤ 1 − w1, w2 ≥ 1 − 2w1, w2 ≤ w1
}
, i.e., we have replaced strict inequal-
ities by the corresponding non-strict inequalities, and considered the integrals∫
p
w1 dw1,
∫
p
w2 dw, and
∫
p
1 dw. This modification is permitted since in gen-
eral the polyhedron P (after the elimination of variable wn) is full dimensional,
i.e., it has dimension n−1, so that the subspaces where equality hold in of of the
inequalities have volume zero.
Lemma 7 For each weighted majority game v there exist positive real numbers
q˜, w˜1, . . . , w˜n−1 and a parameter α > 0 such that(
q˜ + δ0, w˜1 + δ1, . . . , w˜n−1 + δn−1, 1−
n−1∑
i=1
(w˜i + δi)
)
(1)
is a normalized representation of v for all δi ∈ [−α, α], 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
5
Proof. Let (q, w1, . . . , wn) be an integer representation of v, i.e. the weight of
each winning coalition is at least q, and the weight of each losing coalition is
at most q − 1. Since
(
(n + 1)q, (n + 1)w1 + 1, . . . , (n + 1)wn
)
is also an integer
representation of v, we additionally assume w.l.o.g. that wi ≥ 1 for all 1 ≤
i ≤ n. One can easily check that also
(
q − 2
5
+ δ˜0, w1 + δ˜1, . . . , wn + δ˜n
)
is a
representation of v for all δ˜i ∈
[
− 1
5n
, 1
5
n
]
, 0 ≤ i ≤ n. With s =
∑n
i=1wi let
q˜ = 1
s
·
(
q − 2
5
)
and w˜i =
1
s
· wi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. The choice of a suitable α
is a bit technical (α = 1
10ns
does work), but its existence is guaranteed from our
construction. 
Definition 8 For each weighted majority game v the (normalized) weight poly-
hedron Pweight(v) is given by Pweight(v) =
{
w ∈ Rn≥0 | ‖w‖1 = 1, w(S) ≥
w(T )∀ min. winning S and all max. losing T
}
.
By fixing the quota at a suitable value we can directly conclude from Lemma 7:
Corollary 9 The n − 1-dimensional volume of Pweight(v) is non-zero for each
weighted majority game v.
Lemma 10 The average weight index of a weighted majority game v is given by
1∫
Pweight(v)
dw
·
(∫
Pweight(v)
w1 dw, . . . ,
∫
Pweight(v)
wn dw
)
. (2)
We remark that the average weight representations is the center of mass of
the polyhedron Pweight(v).
4.2 The average representation index
As mentioned already in the introduction, one may consider the quota as being
part of the weighted representation. To this end we introduce:
Definition 11 The average representation index of a weighted majority game v
is the average of all normalized3 representations of v.
Definition 12 For each weighted majority game v the (normalized) representa-
tion polyhedron P rep(v) is given by P rep(v) =
{
(q, w) ∈ Rn+1≥0 |
∑n
i=1wi = 1, q ≤
1, w(S) ≥ q ∀ min. winning coalitions S, w(T ) ≤ q ∀ max. losing coalitions T
}
.
Using Lemma 3 and Lemma 7 we conclude:
Lemma 13 The average representation index of a weighted majority game v is
given by
1∫
P rep(v)
d(q, w)
·
(∫
P rep(v)
w1 d(q, w), . . . ,
∫
P rep(v)
wn d(q, w)
)
. (3)
3Taking all representations instead of the normalized ones does not make a difference.
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For our example v = [3; 2, 1, 1] we have
P rep(v) =
{
(q, w) ∈ R4≥0 |
3∑
i=1
wi = 1, w1+w2 ≥ q, w1+w3 ≥ q, w1 ≤ q, w2+w3 ≤ q
}
,
and
∫
P rep(v)
d(q, w) =
2
3∫
1
2
q∫
1−q
1−q∫
q−w1
dw2 dw1 d q +
1∫
2
3
q∫
2q−1
1−q∫
q−w1
dw2 dw1 d q
=
5
648
+
1
162
=
1
72
,
∫
P rep(v)
w1 d(q, w) =
2
3∫
1
2
q∫
1−q
1−q∫
q−w1
w1 dw2 dw1 d q +
1∫
2
3
q∫
2q−1
1−q∫
q−w1
w1 dw2 dw1 d q
=
31
7776
+
1
243
=
7
864
,
∫
P rep(v)
w2 d(q, w) =
2
3∫
1
2
q∫
1−q
1−q∫
q−w1
w2 dw2 dw1 d q +
1∫
2
3
q∫
2q−1
1−q∫
q−w1
w2 dw2 dw1 d q
=
29
15552
+
1
972
=
5
1728
,
so that the average representation index is given by
(
7
12
, 5
24
, 5
24
)
.
4.3 Properties of the new indices
The two newly introduced indices share several of the properties commonly re-
quired for a power index. Three of four properties in Definition 4 are satisfied.
Lemma 14 The average weight and the average representation index are sym-
metric, positive, and efficient, satisfies strong monotonicity, but do not satisfy
the dummy property.
Proof. Symmetry, positivity, and efficiency are inherent in the definition of
both indices. The violation of the dummy property can e.g. be seen at example
[1; 1, 0]. 
The later shortcoming can be repaired using a quite general approach.
Lemma 15 Given a sequence of power indices gn : Cn → R
n for all n ∈ N,
let g˜n : Cn → R
n be defined via g˜ni (v) = g
m
i (v
′) for all non-dummies i and by
g˜nj (v) = 0 for all dummies j, where m is the number of non-dummies in v and v
′
arises from v by dropping the dummies4 All g˜n satisfy the dummy property.
4Given a weighted majority game v : 2N → {0, 1} with S = {i ∈ N | i is dummy}, we define
the dummy reduced game v′ : 2N\S → {0, 1} via v′(T ) = v(T ) for all T ⊆ N\S.
7
We call g˜n the dummy revealing version of a given sequence of power indices
gn. For the computation of the dummy revealing version we just have to compute
the dummy reduced game v′ and its corresponding power distribution.
4.4 Algorithmic computation of the new indices
The computations from Lemma 10 and Lemma 13 can easily be performed using
the software package LattE [Baldoni et al., 2014], i.e., there is no need to perform
the nasty case differentiations and evaluations of multi integrals, as done for our
example, by hand.
game av. weight av. rep. game av. weight av. rep.
[1; 1] (1) (1) [3; 2, 1, 1, 0]
(
67
120
,
47
240
,
47
240
,
1
20
) (
41
75
,
31
150
,
31
150
,
1
25
)
[1; 1, 0]
(
3
4
,
1
4
) (
5
6
,
1
6
)
[1; 1, 1, 1, 1]
(
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
) (
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
)
[1; 1, 1]
(
1
2
,
1
2
) (
1
2
,
1
2
)
[2; 1, 1, 1, 1]
(
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
) (
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
)
[2; 1, 1]
(
1
2
,
1
2
) (
1
2
,
1
2
)
[3; 1, 1, 1, 1]
(
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
) (
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
)
[1; 1, 0, 0]
(
2
3
,
1
6
,
1
6
) (
3
4
,
1
8
,
1
8
)
[4; 1, 1, 1, 1]
(
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
) (
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
)
[1; 1, 1, 0]
(
4
9
,
4
9
,
1
9
) (
11
24
,
11
24
,
1
12
)
[4; 2, 1, 1, 1]
(
23
48
,
25
144
,
25
144
,
25
144
) (
139
300
,
161
900
,
161
900
,
161
900
)
[2; 1, 1, 0]
(
4
9
,
4
9
,
1
9
) (
11
24
,
11
24
,
1
12
)
[3; 2, 1, 1, 1]
(
7
16
,
3
16
,
3
16
,
3
16
) (
43
100
,
19
100
,
19
100
,
19
100
)
[1; 1, 1, 1]
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
) (
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
[2; 2, 1, 1, 1]
(
23
48
,
25
144
,
25
144
,
25
144
) (
139
300
,
161
900
,
161
900
,
161
900
)
[2; 1, 1, 1]
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
) (
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
[3; 2, 2, 1, 1]
(
83
240
,
83
240
,
37
240
,
37
240
) (
103
300
,
103
300
,
47
300
,
47
300
)
[3; 1, 1, 1]
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
) (
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
[4; 2, 2, 1, 1]
(
83
240
,
83
240
,
37
240
,
37
240
) (
103
300
,
103
300
,
47
300
,
47
300
)
[2; 2, 1, 1]
(
11
18
,
7
36
,
7
36
) (
7
12
,
5
24
,
5
24
)
[5; 2, 2, 1, 1]
(
19
48
,
19
48
,
5
48
,
5
48
) (
23
60
,
23
60
,
7
60
,
7
60
)
[3; 2, 1, 1]
(
11
18
,
7
36
,
7
36
) (
7
12
,
5
24
,
5
24
)
[2; 2, 2, 1, 1]
(
19
48
,
19
48
,
5
48
,
5
48
) (
23
60
,
23
60
,
7
60
,
7
60
)
[1; 1, 0, 0, 0]
(
5
8
,
1
8
,
1
8
,
1
8
) (
7
10
,
1
10
,
1
10
,
1
10
)
[4; 3, 1, 1, 1]
(
3
5
,
2
15
,
2
15
,
2
15
) (
29
50
,
7
50
,
7
50
,
7
50
)
[1; 1, 1, 0, 0]
(
5
12
,
5
12
,
1
12
,
1
12
) (
13
30
,
13
30
,
1
15
,
1
15
)
[3; 3, 1, 1, 1]
(
3
5
,
2
15
,
2
15
,
2
15
) (
29
50
,
7
50
,
7
50
,
7
50
)
[2; 1, 1, 0, 0]
(
5
12
,
5
12
,
1
12
,
1
12
) (
13
30
,
13
30
,
1
15
,
1
15
)
[3; 3, 2, 1, 1]
(
449
840
,
227
840
,
41
420
,
41
420
) (
77
150
,
41
150
,
8
75
,
8
75
)
[1; 1, 1, 1, 0]
(
5
16
,
5
16
,
5
16
,
1
16
) (
19
60
,
19
60
,
19
60
,
1
20
)
[5; 3, 2, 1, 1]
(
449
840
,
227
840
,
41
420
,
41
420
) (
77
150
,
41
150
,
8
75
,
8
75
)
[2; 1, 1, 1, 0]
(
5
16
,
5
16
,
5
16
,
1
16
) (
19
60
,
19
60
,
19
60
,
1
20
)
[4; 3, 2, 2, 1]
(
193
480
,
31
120
,
31
120
,
13
160
) (
119
300
,
77
300
,
77
300
,
9
100
)
[3; 1, 1, 1, 0]
(
5
16
,
5
16
,
5
16
,
1
16
) (
19
60
,
19
60
,
19
60
,
1
20
)
[5; 3, 2, 2, 1]
(
193
480
,
31
120
,
31
120
,
13
160
) (
119
300
,
77
300
,
77
300
,
9
100
)
[2; 2, 1, 1, 0]
(
67
120
,
47
240
,
47
240
,
1
20
) (
41
75
,
31
150
,
31
150
,
1
25
)
Table 1: The average weight and average representation index for small weighted
majority games.
In Table 1 we list the average weight and the average representation index for
all weighted majority games with up to 4 voters. We observe that the so-called
dual games obtain the same average weight and average representation index,
which can indeed be proved easily.
5 Conclusion and future research
We have shown how to construct power indices that respect proportionality be-
tween power and weight from average representations of a game. By restricting
the polyhedron implied by the set of minimal winning and maximal losing coali-
tions, we can obtain a representation that is also dummy revealing. This might
be a hint that they principally could be suited to serve as a measurement for
voting power in a certain context. We do not claim that this indeed the case, but
propose the challenge to eventually disqualify such a usage rigorously instead.
Having the ongoing search for the right index in mind, we want to encourage
8
(even) more research with respect to the question of indispensable properties of
measurements of power.
The average representations themselves may have other uses too. They con-
veniently summarize the set of admissible representations of a weighted majority
game into a unique representation, which can then be compared to power dis-
tributions of the classical power indices. We have already restricted the set of
representations in order to obtain a dummy revealing index, but there still may
be much more meaningful ways to introduce further restrictions. So our approach
might lead to a cornucopia of power indices.
We conclude the paper with a remark on integer weights. A normalization of
voting weights is unreasonable if they are to represent the number of shares of a
corporation, or the number of members of a political party. In these cases, we
require the weights to be integers. However, there is still an interpretation of our
indices in these cases, as the following convergence result suggests.
Let us return to the initial example in the introduction, and consider the
weighted majority game v = [2; 1, 1, 1]. We have said that there are 1176 integer
weight vectors being feasible for v with a sum of weights 100. If we average those
representation we obtain
(
100
3
, 100
3
, 100
3
)
or a relative distribution of
(
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)
, which
is no surprise due to the inherent symmetry. Things get a bit more interesting
if one considers the weighted majority game v = [3; 2, 1, 1]. For a weight sum
of 100, we have 1601 different weight vectors, and the averaged relative weight
distribution is given by (0.608832, 0.195584, 0.195584). For a weight sum of 1000,
we obtain 166001 different weight vectors and (0.610888, 0.194556, 0.194556).
For a weight sum of 10000, we obtain 16660001 different weight vectors and
(0.611089, 0.194456, 0.194456). For a weight sum of 100000 we obtain 1666600001
different weight vectors and (0.6111090.1944460.194446). The averaged relative
weight distribution seems to converge to
(
11
18
, 7
36
, 7
36
)
, which is indeed the average
weight index. This can be rigorously proven by numerically approximating the
integrals of the definition of the average weight index using grid points only, and
considering the limit of finer and finer equally distributed grids. The same is true
if an integer valued quota is taken into account. In the limit, we would end up
with the average representation index. Also the dummy revealing property can
be transfered in this sense.
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